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The Relevance of the Army Reserve in Support of the Homeland
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 now authorizes the United States Army Reserve (USAR) to be involuntary mobilized and deployed for defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) missions. According to Major General Luis R. Visot, Deputy Commanding General of Army Reserve Operations, "This change in legislation will have a tremendous impact on our Nation's emergency relief efforts, as Army Reserve units represent a majority of the Army's relief capabilities." 1 This new law allows Army Reserve units to provide disaster relief at the local community, tribal and state levels, and gives the USAR the ability to respond to requests for disaster assistance from state Governors and the President.
The Army Reserve will now be an important piece of the overall Department of Defense (DoD) plans for DSCA response operations. It will also be a key element in the Army's multi-component tiered response force, which will have to coordinate with the active Army and the Army National Guard to ensure all three components work as a fully integrated team. This is an ideal mission for the USAR because the active Army and the National Guard cannot do it alone. Many Army Reserve units have unique capabilities such as chemical, biological radiological, nuclear and high yield explosive (CBRNE) response assets that can be critical to a DSCA response. Other Army Reserve capabilities include search and rescue, aviation lift assets, engineer, transportation, civil affairs, logistics and medical units. Add this to the myriad of professional and civilian acquired skills that Army Reserve Soldiers bring to a disaster response, and there can be no question that the USAR will be a key partner in assisting the Nation in a time of need.
It is critical that Army Reserve units and Soldiers be prepared to quickly respond to natural disaster and other emergency situations when requested to do so. Outside of extreme or immediate emergency conditions, the USAR faces challenges in training, equipping, and rapidly mobilizing and deploying its forces to conduct an efficient, timely and relevant response. This paper will analyze some of these challenges and offer recommendations to ensure the USAR remains relevant for DSCA missions by suggesting the USAR can conduct disaster recovery operations in support of local authorities. The paper begins with a discussion of the legal restrictions imposed on the military's Reserve components prior to the passing of the 2012 NDAA and the impact they had on the DoD's ability to respond. It then discusses the processes that state Governors and the United States Congress went through to change the law to allow the reserve components to be accessed for emergency and disaster response. This discussion is followed by an overview of the response authorities that the DoD, including the Army Reserve, must fall under as part of a tiered federal and military response as outlined in the National Response Framework (NRF).
Although the National Guard should remain first in line for a military disaster response, the Army Reserves can be relevant in its new DSCA mission by becoming more efficient at rapidly alerting, mobilizing and deploying to a no notice disaster or emergency event such as an earthquake, tornado or terrorist incident. When natural or manmade disasters occur, causing significant damage and suffering, it is irrelevant to the citizens affected by the disaster which military component is responding to their needs. The complete effort of all the Services active, National Guard or Reserves, may be necessary to meet all needs. What matters to citizens is receiving the right type of support requested by the emergency management authority at the right time and delivered promptly to the right place. However, prior to the NDAA, the Army Reserve was restricted from providing assistance with complete units and could only support with those who chose to volunteer. 2 
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Although the changes in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act authorize an involuntary mobilization, the Army Reserve will most likely never be the first military responder. They will be part of a tiered military response that starts with the National Guard. The National Guard is the Governor's first line of military response and works under their command and control. The Guard is ideally structured, trained and postured to provide units and specialists to the state to protect life and property, and preserve peace, order, and public safety. The Governor requests National Guard assistance when a situation is beyond the capacity of local, tribal, or state government to control, when all civil resources have been exhausted or, resources are not available from commercial sources. Additionally, a Governor can call upon the National Guard when there is a loss of vital public services or there is an immediate, evident and substantial threat to public health, safety or welfare.
Once the Governor requests federal military forces, they do not come to take over, but come as part of a tiered response to assist the state in Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations. The National Response Framework (NRF) 3 U.S. Navy salvage divers to assist in the recovery of victims beneath the bridge wreckage. 12 Once the mission was completed, the DOT reimbursed the DoD under the Economy Act authority for the Navy salvage dive unit in support of the incident commander.
In an instance where time does not permit prior approval from their higher headquarters, or in the absence of a Stafford Act declaration, DoD Directive (DoDD) Congress rejected the proposed changes however, not because the language permitted the Reserves to be made available for disasters, but because the approved provision would permit the possibility of the states' National Guard to be federalized without the Governor's consent. 41 The possibility of federalization, even during a time of a state emergency, was not acceptable to Governors who feared losing their authority to employ their national guard.
As an example of state Governors applying the Tenth Amendment and the constitutional framework discussed above, after the House passed the FY07 NDAA without the changes, a letter endorsed by all 50 state Governors was sent to the House Armed Services Committee. The letter again conveyed the point that any further attempt to expand the President's authority to federalize the National Guard would be met with heavy resistance. The letter continued with, "We [the State Governors] are responsible for the safety and welfare of our citizens and are in the best position to coordinate all resources to prepare for, respond to and recover from disasters. When federal aid is needed it will be requested and coordinated by the governors." 42 Another attempt to revise 10 USC 12304 was made during the FY09 NDAA process. The Governors again turned it down, this time because there was an issue over their ability to command and control all the forces in the disaster area. Although the availability of Reserve forces, equipment and resources to assist in disasters was welcomed, they felt that having two chains of command, one for National Guard Forces and one for federal forces would disrupt the unity of effort in the disaster response.
A letter dated 10 July 2008 from Governor Easley of North Carolina and Governor
Sanford of South Carolina to the House Armed Service Committee stated that "the issue of a Governor's authority over all forces during a domestic emergency or disaster must be resolved before changes to 10 USC 12304 can be made." 43 The However, without such prior notification, the USAR may not be able to respond as well to a no-notice disaster such as an earthquake, terrorist event or tornado. In order to be relevant in disaster response, the USAR has to be prepared to provide large-scale support within hours, not days because it is during these first few hours that many important activities such as saving lives, preventing human suffering and mitigating great property damage must happen. Super Storm Sandy response was a great first effort for the Army Reserve. In fact, the USAR should embrace DSCA, particularly with regard to recovery to something like Super Storm Sandy, as a central mission that it should plan, program and budget. The USAR should shift its focus on the recovery aspect of DSCA due to the many challenges in eliminating the response time burden to a no notice event. This will require planning, equipping, training and prior coordination.
Challenges to a Timely USAR Response
There will always be a need for defense support to civil authority (DSCA) missions requiring various levels of response. The Army Reserve is well suited to provide support, however it is not yet clear it can be mobilized rapidly or effectively. As discussed, for most states the largest asset available to respond is the State's National
Guard. However, looking beyond the National Guard, there is a wide range of capabilities resident in the USAR that would be useful in responding to a catastrophic 
